



The socioeconomic foundations of authoritarianism: economic inequality as a source of deference to authority (1989- 2022)

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
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We welcome comments and suggestions on this research, please contact the corresponding author for this working paper at:

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Abstract

Authoritarian leaders and parties have emerged across the world during the last decades. Although scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the consequences of authoritarianism for liberal societies, we still know surprisingly little about its causes. Drawing on pooled cross-sections of surveys collected over the last three decades, this article examines whether economic inequality breeds authoritarianism. Using random effects within and between and country fixed-effects and slopes models, main results suggest that authoritarianism is deeply embedded within societies' historical levels of economic inequality. Across countries, persistent inequality points toward a structural driver of deference to authority. Over time, rising inequality within countries explains changes in levels of authoritarianism between the least and the most-well off, showing a divergence effect across income-based lines. Deeper analyses reveal, however, that the conditional effect of inequality over-time is largely driven by the worse-off. Providing mixed support for relative power and existential insecurity theories, findings suggest that the adverse effects of inequality on authoritarianism are largely explained by changes in power relations between more and less resourceful groups in society. These results, stable across various modeling and sample choices, contribute to a growing scholarship trying to ascertain the social sources of authoritarianism and the consequences of persistent levels of economic inequality.

Keywords

Economic inequality, authoritarianism, obedience, public opinion, IVS.

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1. Introduction

Why and how the concentration of wealth and income leads to the concentration of power has been one of the key concerns of scholars in political economy and sociology more broadly. Portraying a classic assumption of political economy, a policy report (Esquivel, 2015, p. 31) revealed how Carlos Slim, a member of Forbes richest world's billionaires list, could hire over two million people simultaneously by paying a minimum wage and still manage to leave his own wealth intact. This striking picture of inequality reflects a long-standing assumption from political theorists claiming that economic inequality invariably leads to political inequality. When money is a resource that shapes the distribution of power, individuals can by react by engaging politically, increasing protest activities, social mobilization, and fueling a more conflictive politics (Brady, 2004; Oliver, 2001; Newman *et al.*, 2015; Gurr, 1970). Yet in contexts of blatant inequality, people can also deal with persistent levels of concentration of wealth and power by developing coping mechanisms, accepting the 'rules of the game' of the powerful and becoming more deferential to authority (Gaventa, 1980; Inglis, 2019; Kelly and Ens, 2010; Solt, 2012).

Despite the great deal of attention on the consequences of authoritarianism –from ethnic, political or religious intolerance, to support for strong hand policies and leaders who endorse non-democratic governmental behavior; see Stenner, 2005; Canneti-Nisim, 2004; Mockabee, 2007; Sprong *et al.*, 2019; Kam and Kinder, 2007; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009–, we still know little about its social foundations. While scholarship has pointed out to gender, social class and education as key individual-level predictors of authoritarianism (e.g., Lipset, 1959; De Regt *et al.*, 2012; Stenner, 2005), we are far from certain about why deference to authority tends to be more widespread in some contexts than others, and perhaps more puzzling, during certain points in time. To explain authoritarianism, existing research relies either on expert ratings, or on conventional indicators where respondents are asked about their support for a specific party, leader or regime type (e.g., Buckley *et al.*, 2024; Panzano, 2023; Truex and

Tavana, 2019; Lee, 2024). To address these gaps, this article uses a more fine-grained non-intrusive survey item to measure authoritarianism by assessing changes in people's support for hierarchical parent-child relationships, fitting Random Effects Within and Between (REWB) and country Fixed Effects and Slopes (cFES) models to representative samples of over 300,000 individuals in over 60 countries consistently observed during the last decades (1989-2022).

Main results provide strong evidence that both levels and changes in deference to authority are deeply embedded in societies' historical levels of economic inequality. First, persistent levels of inequality point toward a structural driver of authoritarianism. I find a very clear effect of inequality across countries, showing how authoritarian orientations are more prevalent in countries with higher economic inequality, controlling for compositional effects at the individual-level as well as for key time-variant and invariant contextual confounders. Second, over time, rising inequality within countries predicts changes in the strength of the relationship between income and authoritarianism. Although individuals in countries with comparatively high levels of inequality systematically report higher levels of authoritarianism, rising inequality leads to different patterns of change among more and less advantaged individuals. However, deeper analyses reveal that the longitudinal effect of inequality on authoritarianism is largely driven by the worse-off. These findings suggest that in contexts of blatant inequality, the most disadvantaged groups in society tend to deal with the rising concentration of income by developing coping mechanisms, clinging to authority and increasing their levels of authoritarianism over the long run. Implications and limitations of these findings are further discussed in the conclusions section.

2. Theoretical background

The question of why do people obey authority goes back to the foundations of sociology and the social sciences more broadly. Since the roots of obedience and deference to authority are deeply embedded within societies' formal and informal norms, the mechanisms to explain the social sources of authoritarianism from a comparative perspective have been the subject of

conflicting hypothesis. A key strand of research holds that inequality should increase obedience to authority, regardless of where individuals stand in the income distribution (e.g., Solt, 2012). An alternative body of work suggests that this association should differ depending on peoples' position of relative disadvantage (e.g., Inglehart and Bakker, 2000). In this section, I review the main theories regarding the social sources of deference to authority, which lead to conflicting hypothesis about the association between inequality and authoritarianism.

2.1. Economic inequality and authoritarianism

Since early twentieth century, the seminal approaches to explain obedience and deference to authority have mainly focused on the individual-level predictors of authoritarianism. First, largely based on a psychoanalytical approach, labelled as the “authoritarian personality” (Adorno *et al.*, 1950; Altemeyer, 1998), some studies shared the assumption that authoritarianism was either inborn, or due to personality traits or syndromes that individuals develop mainly during childhood (Stenner, 2005). Later on, the idea of social learning (i.e., peoples' experience with authority, see Altemeyer, 1996) played an important role, shifting our understanding of authoritarianism as consequence of social values and beliefs rather than a direct expression of personality (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Feldman, 2003; Kreindler, 2005).

Scholarship has pointed to gender, social class and education as the main individual-level drivers of authoritarianism, offering mixed results. While some studies report no gender differences (e.g., Nagoshi *et al.*, 2007; Peterson and Lane, 2001), others find that men are more authoritarian than women (e.g., Lippa, 1995), and others, instead, that women are more authoritarian than men (e.g., Whitley, 1999). Studies focusing on class and education find that people with higher levels of education tend to be less authoritarian, while those pertaining to the working class are more strongly inclined toward authoritarianism (in line with Lipset's (1959) working-class authoritarianism theory; e.g., Regt, Smits and Mortelmans, 2012; Stenner, 2005, but see Dekker and Ester, 1987).

Individual-level explanations do not account, however, for why levels of authoritarianism are systematically higher(lower) in some countries than others, and perhaps more puzzling, during certain points in time. Key in this regard are studies showing authoritarianism tends to be more driven by situational factors and socioeconomic conditions than by personality traits or characteristics (e.g., Oesterreich, 2005; Duckitt and Fisher, 2003; Duckitt, 2015). Historical cases often illustrate how economic downturns and periods of political turmoil can lead to a fast-rising support for authoritarian parties and leaders who promise to restore order or lead a country towards a desired situation (e.g., Sprong *et al.*, 2019; Oesterreich, 2005; Reich, 1946).

Building upon these assumptions, a key strand of research holds that the level of authoritarianism depends on the distribution of economic power in a society. The “relative power” theory (Solt, 2012) maintains that in countries with higher economic inequality, social relations will tend to be more hierarchical, making individuals more prone to experience positions of either subservience or unquestioned obedience to authority. By creating a more hierarchical distribution of market power, thereby increasing the relative power of individuals with more resources, this process can make social relations to be more characterized by vertical notions of authority.

Crucially, this is expected to hold among both more and less advantaged individuals. For more disadvantaged citizens, higher levels of economic inequality will increase their position of powerlessness, rendering them more likely to internalize the ‘rules of the game’ of the powerful as an adaptive response (Gaventa, 1980; Solt, 2012). For the better off, in turn, higher levels of inequality will tend to reinforce their position ahead in the socio-economic hierarchy, making them more prone to expect obedience from people below in the socio-economic structure. This should be particularly prevalent in societies with blatant inequality, where money often governs very basic aspects of life (e.g., healthcare, education, political voice) (see Sandel, 2012).

Thus, when money is a resource that shapes the distribution of power between members of a given society, larger income differences will create different expectations depending on where individuals are located in the income distribution (either ‘at the top’, or ‘at the bottom’). Higher levels of inequality will thereby lead to a greater internalization of the ‘rules of the game’ of the powerful, reinforcing a vertical notion of obedience to authority among both more and less advantaged individuals. Whether obedience means obedience *for* the better-off, or obedience *from* the worse-off, authoritarianism will be more prevalent among more and less advantaged individuals alike.

Hypothesis 1: Authoritarianism should be higher in more unequal countries, regardless of where individuals fall in the income distribution.

The underlying idea of the relative power theory is that the contextual effect of exposure to higher levels of income inequality is homogeneous across income levels. By contrast, the “existential insecurity” theory (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) expects this association to differ depending on where individuals stand in the income distribution. In other words, higher levels of inequality are expected to condition citizens’ authoritarian orientations depending on their position of relative (dis)advantage. When persistent inequality represents an enduring tendency for the rich to become richer, and for the majority of people to be left-behind (Inglehart, 2016; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Atkinson, 2015), higher inequality can deepen the position of existential insecurity among the most disadvantaged members of society. By widening the distance between different socio-economic groups, exposing lower-income individuals to a deeper state of economic deprivation, this process can make them more likely to cling to authority as an adaptive response (Inglehart and Bakker, 2000; Feldman and Stenner, 1997). Evidence suggests that when facing greater existential risks, people tend to trade-off critical orientations for authoritarian orientations (e.g., Foa and Welzel, 2023; Osterreich, 2005; Feldman, 2003). By contrast, higher inequality tends to reinforce the position of economic *security* among people

located at the upper tail of the income distribution. Considering higher inequality means shifting more money to the top of the income distribution, tilting the balance and increasing the advantages of the well-off (Polacko, 2021; Jackson and Holzman, 2020), more advantaged individuals will become less worried about experiencing economic deprivation in more economically unequal societies.

When individuals' life circumstances become more secure, and the possibility of suffering economic insecurity becomes less threatening, this can lead them to rely less on obedience and deference to authority. This expectation builds upon Inglehart's postmaterialist value shift thesis (1995, 1997), which claims one of the main dimensions of change as countries standards of living increase is a decline in deference to authority. Modernization theorists have long argued economic prosperity can shape "pro-democratic mass preferences", triggering a decline in value orientations that endorse unquestioning obedience to authoritarian rule (e.g., Dahl, 1997; Welzel and Inglehart, 2005, p. 85). Following this expectation, the effect of being exposed to higher levels of inequality should be particularly prevalent among individuals who are more likely to experience economic insecurity, and thus more prone to cling to authority as an adaptive response.

Hypothesis 2: The contextual effect of economic inequality on authoritarianism differs across income levels. In contexts of higher economic inequality, less advantaged individuals should be more authoritarian.

Both hypotheses presented above underline the effect of *levels* of inequality on *levels* of authoritarianism. However, if economic inequality is the cause of authoritarianism, we could also expect not only more unequal societies to have more authoritarian citizens, but also that individuals become more authoritarian as inequality grows. As economic inequality has been on the rise globally during the last decades (Atkinson, 2015; Saez and Zucman, 2020), I expect changes in inequality to trigger changes in levels of authoritarianism. Here, the relative power and existential security theories yield different expectations. Based on the relative power

proposition, both more and less advantaged individuals should reinforce their authoritarian orientations with rising inequality. However, evidence in support for the existential security theory should show different patterns of change over-time among more and less advantaged individuals.

Hypothesis 3a: Rising inequality should increase authoritarianism both among the least and the most well-off.

Hypothesis 3b: The gap in authoritarianism levels between the least and the most well-off should become wider as inequality increases.

3. Data and operationalization

3.1. Data

To assess the extent to which income inequality shapes authoritarianism within countries, I employ microdata from the Integrated Values Survey (IVS). The IVS combines the WVS and the EVS, gathering representative samples from over 100 countries over a time span that goes back to the 1980's. I include all available waves where individuals were asked about their authoritarian orientations. Given the interest on the longitudinal effect of economic inequality, I restrict the main analytic sample to respondents over 18 years old, from countries surveyed in at least three waves (see table A1, supplementary materials). After taking missing values on key variables into account, I was able to retrieve data for 342,933 individuals, 259 country-years, and 64 countries. As shown below, I replicate the main findings retaining countries that were surveyed in least four and five occasions, retrieving data for 304,225 in 51 countries, and 241,697 in 38 countries (see Tables A2 and A3 in the supplementary materials).

3.2. Authoritarianism

To measure authoritarianism, I use a question in which respondents were asked, from a list of eleven qualities (obedience, good manners, independence, hard work, feeling of responsibility, imagination, tolerance and respect for other people, saving money, perseverance, religious faith,

and unselfishness), to choose maximum five that children should learn at home. Respondents who chose “obedience” were coded as 1 (0 otherwise).

While the discussion on how to appropriately measure authoritarianism goes back to Adorno’s *et al.* (1950) and Altemeyer’s (1981) F and Right-Wing Authoritarianism scales, recent scholarship suggests childrearing values are the most non-intrusive measure to capture orientations toward authority (e.g., Solt, 2012; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). Conventional indicators to measure authoritarianism rely on either on expert ratings, or on survey items where respondents are asked about their support for a specific party, leader or regime type (e.g., Buckley *et al.*, 2024; Panzano, 2023; Truex and Tavana, 2019; Lee, 2024). Yet, evidence suggests that the former can potentially capture subjective coder bias (e.g., Little and Meng, 2024; Levick and Olavarria-Gambi, 2020; Bush and Platas, 2024), and the latter trigger political priors or uncritically supportive responses (Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007; Claasen *et al.*, 2024). By capturing their notion of authoritarianism in family relations, this item provides a unique indicator of individuals’ deep feelings toward authority.

In a scale ranging from 1 to 100, a grand-mean of 33 shows how pooling across all available countries and waves between 1981 and 2022, a minority of people consider obedience as one of the most desirable qualities for children to learn. There is, however, key variation across countries, anticipating persistent differences in authoritarianism across countries. In countries like Ghana (77), India (69) or Ecuador (61), more than half of the population considered obedience as one of the most desirable qualities for children to learn. By contrast, less than 15 percent of individuals choose obedience in countries like Iceland (12), South Korea (11) or Japan (05) (see Figure A1, supplementary materials). Considering childrearing measures capture authoritarian orientations at the level of some of the most private social relationships, we could expect this indicator to be largely stable over the long run. Although this is the case for most countries, descriptive results show there are countries with higher levels of authoritarianism experiencing a decreasing trend (e.g., Chile, Peru, Morocco), and countries

with low levels of authoritarianism experiencing a trend toward higher levels of authoritarianism (e.g., Ireland, Latvia, Czech Republic) (see Figure A2, supplementary materials). Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable can be seen in the online appendix (Table A4, supplementary materials).

3.3. Predictors

The main predictors are income inequality, measured at the country-year-level, and household income, measured at the individual-level. To measure contextual income inequality, I rely on the “Standardized World Income Inequality Database” (SWIID) (Solt, 2020). The SWIID employs the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) as the standard, incorporating data from sources such as the OECD Income Distribution Database, the World Bank or Eurostat, among others, in order to maximize the comparability of income inequality measures and its broadest possible coverage across countries and over time. I calculated the Gini index in order to match it with each sample of country-years, based a measure of disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) incomes.

To measure individual-level income, I rely on the net household income question from the IVS, where (based on household income scales specified in national currency) respondents were asked to locate their household income in a scale where 1 indicates the lowest income group, and 10 the highest income group (counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in)¹. First, accounting for potential problems of household income survey questions, which are often not comparable across countries and waves, I introduced Donnelly and Pop-Elches (2018) weighted income percentile measure. Although I consider this the most theoretically sound measure (i.e., calculated by assigning all individuals the middle of the possible percentiles for their category) the correlation between the IVS standard net household income question and Donnelly and Pop-Elches (2018) weighted income percentile measure is

¹ “On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.”

0.88. Given that using the latter implies dropping 118,638 individuals and 164 country-years, thereby losing relevant variation over time in most countries, I decided to maintain the IVS household income scales question. Since expectations are not about unit change (i.e., whether authoritarianism is affected by each additional income point a respondent makes), but about the effect of social stratification, this measure is useful to identify income ranges within countries and capture people's rank in society. Previous research suggests that this item can be used to rank respondents based on their position relative to the rest of respondents, reflecting income ranges within countries and relative status (Pastor Mayo, 2024). Finally, as expectations refer to differences between the top and the bottom of society, I decided to trade-off descriptive accuracy and reduce the possibility of obtaining random noise, collapsing the 10-point scale income variable into income quintiles (1 being low, 2 lower-middle, 3 middle, 4 upper-middle, and 5 top). Descriptive statistics of the main predictors can be seen in the online appendix (Table A5, supplementary materials)

3.4. Controls

At the contextual-level, I control for economic prosperity and level of democracy at the country-year level, as well as for broad cultural characteristics of countries at the country-level. First, research emphasizes the importance of accounting for the level of economic prosperity when analyzing the potential effect of income inequality. From a technical stance, scholarship suggests economic development is expected to be a potential confounder of economic inequality (e.g., Finseraas, 2009; Heston *et al.*, 2002), particularly in time points where this relationship is linear and growth produces more inequality (see Van der Weide and Milanovic, 2018 for a more detailed discussion). Substantively, scholarship yields opposing predictions about the effect of economic prosperity on obedience to authority. Some studies argue that as societies grow richer, people tend to rely less on values oriented toward deference to traditional authorities (e.g., Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Others, that economic development puts people in a position of uncertainty, challenging individual expectations and

triggering reliance on authority (e.g., Osterreich, 2005; Fromm, 1941; Billig, 1978). To account for the potential effect of economic prosperity, I introduce the Gdp per capita (in thousands of dollars) in its logged form, based on the Penn World Table (PWT) (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015)².

Second, to control for the potential effect of countries democratic tradition on individuals' levels of authoritarianism, I rely on Boix *et al.* (2022) indicator of countries democracy duration, which measures the number of consecutive years the country has had the same regime type. If we expect the democratic tradition of a country to affect individuals' authoritarianism levels, I believe this measure (particularly useful as a control, see Beck *et al.*, 1998) to be more appropriate indicator than alternative indicators which measure a country's current level of democracy. Third, I control for broad cultural characteristics of countries. While a line of thought expects traditional values to decline (or even be replaced) with modernization (e.g., Inglehart and Baker, 2000), other claims these to be independent of economic conditions, thereby leaving an imprint on people's minds beyond the levels of economic development (e.g., DiMaggio, 1994). Following Inglehart and Baker (2000), I introduce dummies to account for the potential effect of countries with Postsocialist, Confucian or Catholic heritage (1 for Postsocialist, Confucian, and Catholic heritage, 0 otherwise).

Fourth, previous scholarship shows the importance of accounting for religiosity to explain individuals' levels of deference to authority (e.g., Weller *et al.*, 1975; Canetti-Nisim, 2004; Federico *et al.*, 2021). Thus, besides including broad cultural categories at the contextual-level, I also account for the potential effect of religiosity at the individual-level, using an indicator of attendance to religious services (7-point scale; being 1 if they never or practically never attend religious services, and 7 more than once a week). Finally, I include a set of standard socioeconomic controls: gender (1 for women), age (a continuous variable with a mean of 44),

² I decided not to distinguish between the cross sectional and longitudinal components of Gdp per capita given that the within measure is strongly correlated with time (0.76, $p < .001$). The correlation between the raw measure of logged Gdp per capita and time is 0.32 ($p < .001$) (see Table A6, supplementary materials).

education (3-point scale, 1 being lower, 2 being middle, and 3 being upper), and having children (5-point scale, 0 being no children, and 4 four or more children). Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of all variables can be seen in the online appendix (Table A5 and A6, supplementary materials).

4. Empirical strategy

To test the hypothesis, I employ hierarchical mixed models and country fixed effects models. First, I fit three-level Random Effects Within and Between models (REWB), in order to capture variation both across countries and over time without violating the independent errors assumption (Bell and Jones, 2015; Snijders and Bosker, 2012). This approach is key to assess the longitudinal effect of time-variant (e.g., income inequality, economic prosperity) and invariant predictors (e.g., postsocialist, Catholic, Confucian heritage) included in the sample. This decomposition is also useful considering previous studies that assess whether economic inequality shapes individuals' feelings toward authority have not distinguished between the cross-sectional and longitudinal components of inequality (e.g., Solt, 2012). Not including this decomposition, however, provides a weighted average of the two types of components (see Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). And considering cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships are not necessarily equivalent (Halaby, 2004, p. 527), presenting a cross-sectional effect as an indicator of change over time implies over interpreting the results (Fairbrother, 2014, p. 121).

Second, to assess whether changes in inequality affect individuals differently across income-based lines, I interact the income measure with the within component of economic inequality, I including a random intercept and slope for the income variable (Heisig and Schaeffer, 2019) at the country and country-year levels. Given the discontinuous evolution of the outcome variable (see Figure A3, supplementary materials), I introduce wave dummies ($\beta_4 wave_{tk}$) to account for the possibility that the outcome and main predictors are trending for unrelated reasons. The model can be specified as follows:

$$y_{itk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1itk} + \beta_2 x_{2tk} + \beta_3 x_{3k} + \gamma_{WE}(Z_{tk} - \bar{Z}_k) + \gamma_{BE}\bar{Z}_k + \beta_4 wave_{tk} + v_k + u_{tk} + e_{itk}$$

The model includes separate error terms at the country (v_k) and country-year (u_{tk}) levels, so that the average level of authoritarianism can vary randomly within both levels. To test the hypothesis, I include cross-level interaction effects and thus random slopes, introducing an error term for income so that this individual-level variable can vary randomly across country-years and countries. The overall nesting structure of the model distinguishes between individuals (i), country-years (t), and countries (k), and e_{itk} represents an idiosyncratic error. Given the key interest on both the direct and conditional effect of inequality on authoritarianism over time, I decompose the Gini coefficient into two separate terms (calculating the group-mean ($\bar{Z}_k$) and then subtracting this value from each country-year ($Z_{tk} - \bar{Z}_k$), which are orthogonal to each other by construction (Fairbrother, 2014).

Furthermore, recent studies argue that including both random intercept and slope at least for the level 1 variable of interest might not be enough when trying to obtain a genuine within estimator in a cross-level interaction, I also present the results of country fixed-effects (FE) and slopes model (cFES) (Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran, 2019). As Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran (2019, p. 198) show, when including a cross-level interaction, the standard country FE approach (i.e., using country dummies to absorb unobservable cluster-specific differences) might not yield an accurate within effect given that the introduction of country dummies accounts for heterogeneity in levels but not in slopes. When the main interest is not on the direct effect of a contextual variable (e.g., economic inequality) on an outcome (e.g., authoritarianism), but on its moderating effect on an individual characteristic (e.g., income), the model is simultaneously capturing the effect of inequality on authoritarianism, conditional on income ($\frac{\partial authoritarianism}{\partial income} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 inequality_t$), and the effect of income on authoritarianism, conditional on inequality ($\frac{\partial authoritarianism}{\partial inequality} = \beta_2 + \beta_3 income_{it}$). To

account for the possibility of potential confounding given that the random slope in the interaction term might not be accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across slopes, the cFES specification includes an additional interaction between the country dummies and the two terms included in the interaction (i.e., the Gini coefficient at the country-year level, and income at the individual-level). The next section presents the results.

5. Results

Before turning into the multivariate results, we present a series of plots that describe the bivariate relationship between economic inequality and authoritarianism. The bivariate correlation yields different results when taking into account the diverse components of inequality. First, there is a very strong relationship cross-sectionally (0.58, $p < 0.001$) (see Figure A4, supplementary materials). Following Solt's (2012: 706) approach –calculating the country-year mean of authoritarianism and plotting it against inequality– also shows a strong correlation (0.49, $p < 0.001$) (see Figure A5, supplementary materials). However, the correlation between the longitudinal component of inequality and authoritarianism is 0.03 ($p < 0.001$) (see Figure A6, supplementary materials). These results suggest that the difference in coefficients is indeed systematic (as a Hausman test anticipates; $\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.93$), and thus the effect of inequality on authoritarianism holds mainly across countries.

When turning into the multivariate results, a null model shows key variation both across countries and over time (8% at the country-level, and 12 % at the country-year level). Table 1 presents the main results of the REWB models (full results are shown in Table A7). First, Model 1 introduces the raw Gini index, controlling for contextual time-variant and time-invariant predictors. Second, Model 2 introduces the cross-sectional and longitudinal portions of economic inequality. Finally, Models 3 and 4 include interactive terms between the within component of inequality and the individual-level income variable. All models include individual-level socio-demographic controls.

Models 1 and 2 confirm how variation in levels of inequality is mainly cross-sectional. While the coefficient of the raw Gini index is positive and statistically significant (Model 1), this effect increases when introducing the between component. The estimate of the within portion, instead, is near 0 and fails to reach statistical significance (Model 2). Models 2 to 4 show that the cross-sectional effect of inequality is robust to the inclusion of individual and contextual-level controls, as well as cross-level interactions. Models 1 to 4 further suggest a linear effect of income. This result indicates that while countries with higher economic inequality are, on average, more authoritarian, individuals located at the upper-middle and top-income quintiles tend to be less authoritarian compared to those located at the lower-middle and bottom quintiles. All models show this effect is robust, suggesting authoritarianism significantly decreases as individuals' income level increases.

Table 1. The Effect of Economic Inequality on Authoritarianism, REWB estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Predictors</i>				
Income quintile (<i>ref. bottom</i>)				
Lower-middle (2)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.027* (0.011)
Middle (3)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.068*** (0.014)	-0.071*** (0.013)
Upper-middle (4)	-0.045*** (0.003)	-0.045*** (0.003)	-0.070*** (0.019)	-0.075*** (0.017)
Top (5)	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.099*** (0.025)	-0.108*** (0.023)
<i>Country-year-level variables</i>				
Gini	0.005** (0.002)			
Gini (BE)		0.006*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Gini (WE)		-0.000 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>				
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)			-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)			-0.004* (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)			-0.007** (0.002)	-0.008* (0.003)
<i>Contextual controls</i>				
Gdp/capita (logged)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.047** (0.016)	-0.041* (0.017)	-0.043* (0.017)
Years of democracy	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Postsocialist	-0.071 (0.038)	-0.061 (0.038)	-0.051 (0.042)	-0.051 (0.041)
Confucian heritage	-0.202*** (0.048)	-0.199*** (0.047)	-0.223*** (0.052)	-0.220*** (0.051)
Catholic heritage	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.000 (0.027)	0.013 (0.029)	0.014 (0.029)

Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.398*** (0.092)	0.354*** (0.095)	0.338*** (0.101)	0.361*** (0.101)
<i>N</i> countries	64	64	64	64
<i>N</i> country-years	259	259	259	259
<i>N</i> respondents	342,933	342,933	342,933	342,933

Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022 (sample A).

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include gender, age, education, labor market status, number of children, and religiosity controls. Full results in Table A7.


*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

To test the hypothesis proposed, Models 3 and 4 include interactive terms between the within portion of inequality and individual-level income. Both models account for variables introduced at all levels, and include random slopes at the country (Model 3) and at the country-year level (Model 4). Both models reveal negative and statistically significant interaction effects across income quintiles, suggesting that the negative relationship between income and authoritarianism becomes stronger as economic inequality increases. This result is also informative of why the coefficient of the longitudinal portion of inequality is close to 0, considering the average effect across the five income groups is mainly concentrated among the upper- and lower-income quintiles.

To better illustrate this effect, Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of the association between income and authoritarianism, conditional on increasing inequality. The Figure suggests that changes in inequality have triggered a divergence effect across income-based lines. That is, as inequality grows over time, individuals with lower income positions tend to become more authoritarian and, instead, those with higher income positions, less authoritarian. This results yields support for H2, suggesting that the effect of economic inequality on authoritarianism differs across income levels. Hence, running against H1, although more unequal countries are on average more authoritarian, the effect is heterogeneous over time. Focusing on the effect of inequality relying on within-country variation only, this result suggests that the effect of changes in inequality depends on where individuals fall in the income distribution. Therefore, opposite as expected in H3a, this result does not support the argument that rising inequality increases authoritarianism among both the least and the most well off. As

hypothesized in H3b, it suggests the gap in authoritarianism across income groups is becoming wider with rising inequality.

Figure 1. The Longitudinal Effect of Income Inequality on Authoritarianism Across Income Levels, sample A (95% CI)



Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022 (sample A).

Notes: The Figure is based on Model 3 from Table 1.

To further reduce the possibility of obtaining less accurate estimates due to potential biases caused by unaccounted heterogeneity in the interaction term (i.e., to control for unobserved heterogeneity across slopes), Table 2 presents the cFES models. First, Model 1 includes the two-way interaction between the within component of inequality and individual-level income. Second, to control for effect heterogeneity on income, Model 2 includes an additional interaction between the country dummies and the income variable. Third, to control for effect heterogeneity on inequality, Model 3 includes an additional interaction between the country dummies and inequality. Finally, to control for effect heterogeneity in both income and inequality, Model 4 includes two additional interactions between the country dummies, income, and inequality. All models include individual-level socio-demographic controls and time dummies.

Table 2. The Effect of Economic Inequality on Authoritarianism, cFES estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Predictors</i>				
Income quintile (<i>ref. bottom</i>)				

Lower-middle (2)	-0.084*** (0.012)	-0.112 (0.121)	-0.071*** (0.012)	-0.118 (0.123)
Middle (3)	-0.127*** (0.012)	0.022 (0.114)	-0.128*** (0.012)	0.019 (0.119)
Upper-middle (4)	-0.226*** (0.014)	-0.063 (0.133)	-0.235*** (0.014)	-0.063 (0.133)
Top (5)	-0.341*** (0.019)	-0.340* (0.156)	-0.356*** (0.019)	-0.349* (0.157)
Gini	0.009 (0.005)	0.012* (0.006)	0.021 (0.013)	0.024 (0.014)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>				
Gini*Lower-middle (2)	-0.020** (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.024** (0.008)
Gini*Middle (2)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.024** (0.008)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.009)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)	-0.033** (0.012)	-0.035* (0.014)	-0.039** (0.012)	-0.033* (0.014)
Constant	-0.178* (0.076)	-0.254* (0.111)	-0.836*** (0.125)	-0.839*** (0.151)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies*Income		Yes		
Country dummies*Gini			Yes	
Country dummies*Income*Gini				Yes
N respondents	342,933	342,933	342,933	342,933
R ²	0.109	0.111	0.114	0.116

Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022 (sample A).

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include economic performance, years of democracy, gender, age, education, labor market status, number of children, and religiosity controls. Full results in Table A8. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

The results yield support for the main effect reported in the REWB models presented in Table 1. Table 2 shows that changes in inequality have no direct effect on changes in authoritarianism (Models 1, 3 and 4). Yet, the cross-level interaction between inequality and individual-level income reveals negative and statistically significant interaction effects across income quintiles (Models 1 to 4). This result yields further support for H2, suggesting that rising inequality affects individuals differently depending of their relative position in the income distribution. As hypothesized in H3b (and thus opposite as expected in H3a), rising inequality triggers a divergence effect across income groups, widening the gap in authoritarianism levels. This effect is highly robust, considering that it is consistent when including random slopes, accounting for any potential remaining heterogeneity in the slope of the interaction, controlling for the composition of groups at the individual-level, and introducing key potential confounders. Yet, to further assess the consistency of the results, the next section presents a series of robustness checks.

6. Robustness checks


To assess the robustness of the main results, I conducted several alternative tests. First, to assess whether the main effect is sensitive to potentially outlier cases, I conducted jackknife estimations (reestimating the main model excluding one country at a time). The between portion of the Gini consistently yields positive and statistically significant coefficients, which range from 0.005 to 0.006 –depending which country is excluded from the sample–. Instead, while the longitudinal portion points toward the expected direction, it yields non-significant coefficients –regardless of which country is excluded from the sample–. Finally, the negative interaction effect between inequality and income remains negative and statistically significant in every sample, providing further support for the consistency of the main findings (see full results in Table A9, supplementary materials). Second, despite the evolution of the dependent variable seems to be trending non-linearly (see Figure A3, supplementary materials), I also accounted for the potential effect of controlling for alternative functional forms of time. Therefore, I reestimated the main models replacing the time dummies for a linear time trend, obtaining highly similar results (see table A10, supplementary materials). Third, acknowledging the importance of controlling for the potential effect of countries democratic tradition in the REWB models, I reestimated the main models introducing an alternative measure of democracy (namely, V-Dem’s liberal democracy index; see Coppedge *et al.*, 2024). This variable has no effect and the main results were unchanged (see Table A11, supplementary materials). Lastly, acknowledging the potential issue derived from potentially obtaining biased estimates due to unbalance and limited degrees of freedom, I replicated the main results restricting the sample to countries observed in at least four (sample B), and five occasions (sample C). The results are graphically presented in Figures 2 and 3 (full results are shown in Tables A12 and A13, supplementary materials)³. It is important to recall that sample A,

³ Notably, acknowledging the ongoing discussion about how many countries should be included in multilevel models (see Stegmueller, 2013), it is still possible to obtain reasonable asymptotics even when employing these alternative samples.

corresponding to the main results presented here, retains only countries observed in at least three occasions. Therefore, increasing the number of observations in order to get closer to a quasi-balanced panel can be useful to detect whether a certain income group is sensible to changes in the sample and whether certain income groups are mainly driving the effect.

Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 suggest that more advantaged individuals tend to be less authoritarian compared to less advantaged individuals as inequality rises, providing support for H3b. Nevertheless, Figures 2 and 3 show that rather than the gap in levels of authoritarianism between the least and the most well-off becoming wider, it is the lower income quintiles whose levels of authoritarianism increase with growing inequality. Figures 1 to 3 show how while the slope is steep and positive for the lower income quintile, it is sensitive to changes in the sample among the top quintile. Hence, the heterogeneous effect (i.e., authoritarianism increasing for the least well off and decreasing for the better off) becomes less clear as the time stamp is wider. Instead, the positive effect for the lower income quintile is highly robust and the slope becomes even steeper when increasing the degrees of freedom in the sample.


Figure 2. The Longitudinal Effect of Income Inequality on Authoritarianism Across Income Levels, sample B (95% CI)



Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022 (sample B).

Notes: The Figure is based on Model 3 from Table A8.

Figure 3. The Longitudinal Effect of Income Inequality on Authoritarianism Across Income Levels, sample C (95% CI)



Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022 (sample C).

Notes: The Figure is based on Model 3 from Table A9.

Three main findings emerge from the analyses. First, there is no direct effect of inequality over time, suggesting that the main effect of inequality on authoritarianism holds only across countries. Second, as expected in H3b, the conditional longitudinal effect of inequality is heterogeneous across income groups. Rising inequality affects the strength of the relationship between income and authoritarianism, depending on where individuals stand in the income distribution. Third, the robustness checks show how the heterogeneous effect across income groups it is less robust among more advantaged individuals, and it is the worse-off who seem to be particularly sensitive to rising inequality.

7. Conclusion and discussion

The consequences of authoritarianism have become widely discussed given the secular trend on the rise of authoritarian leaders and parties in most Western democracies. While since Adorno (1950) and Altemeyer (1998) scholars have dedicated a lot of attention on the consequences of this phenomena focusing on the individual-level predictors of authoritarianism, we still know little about its socioeconomic foundations. To contribute to this discussion, in this article I examined the evolution of peoples' deference to authority, using

microdata from 64 countries observed during a period of over three decades (1989-2022). I employed pooled cross-sections of surveys from six waves of the IVS, assessing whether changes in inequality are linked to changes in authoritarianism, and the extent to which there is systematic heterogeneity in individuals' response to rising inequality across more and less advantaged individuals.

To test the social sources of authoritarianism, I built upon two complementary theories that shed light on the causal mechanisms to explain the relationship between inequality and authoritarianism. While the relative power theory holds that in highly stratified societies a more hierarchical distribution of market power makes individuals more prone to develop vertical notions of authority, the existential insecurity theory that when individuals are more exposed to the threat of economic deprivation, they become more likely to cling to authority as an adaptive response. Although both theories expect inequality to increase authoritarianism among the worse-off (albeit for different reasons), they differ on how it should affect better-off individuals. Differently put, the relative power theory expects this effect to be *homogeneous* across income groups (i.e., both the rich and the poor experience a shift towards higher levels of authoritarianism as inequality rises), and the existential insecurity theory *heterogeneous* (i.e., the effect should be different depending of where individuals stand in the income distribution). In this article I explicitly tested both theories, assessing the direct and conditional effect of economic inequality on authoritarianism across countries and over time.

First, the main results confirm the general effect inequality on authoritarianism, pointing toward a structural driver of peoples stratified notion of deference to authority. That is, while individuals with higher incomes are on average less authoritarian, countries with higher levels of economic inequality tend to have more authoritarian citizens. In contrast with previous studies, I only report a cross-sectional direct effect of economic inequality on authoritarianism. While Solt (2012: 703) argues that “economic inequality within countries shapes individuals’ feelings toward authority”, I found no direct effect within countries. This finding becomes

particularly relevant considering a cross-country effect is at best an indicator of a potential relationship, and also a less robust one considering it entails the well-known challenges of causal identification and the threat of not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across units (Gangl, 2010). If countries with higher inequality tend to have more authoritarian citizens, *ceteris paribus*, the result does not support that individuals become more authoritarian as inequality grows.

In this vein, the main results suggest that the effect is not direct but conditional. Rising inequality has no direct effect on changes in authoritarianism over time, but on the strength of the relationship between individual-level income and authoritarianism. In support for the economic insecurity theory (and against the relative power theory), the longitudinal interactive coefficient points toward a divergence effect, showing that the effect of changes in inequality on authoritarianism depends of where individuals fall in the income distribution. However, increasing the available time points in the sample makes the evidence is less clear among more advantaged individuals. By illustrating the asymmetry in the response to inequality among different income groups, these results provide mixed support for the relative power and economic insecurity theories. Considering both offer similar expectations on the effect of inequality among the worse-off—suggesting less advantaged groups are particularly sensitive to rising inequality—, these findings suggest that either as a consequence of group powerlessness, or as an individual response to cope with economic insecurity, rising inequality reshapes power relations between more and less resourceful groups in society, increasing authoritarian orientations among the worse-off.

The implications of these findings are linked to the discussion about the social and political consequences of rising inequality. Firstly, a growing body of work emphasizes the importance of assessing how more and less advantaged social groups interact in contexts of sharp inequality, and what are the long-term consequences for social cohesion. While the idea that inequality leads to greater social insulation has long been present in the social sciences (i.e.,

social environments where interactions between people from different socioeconomic backgrounds become scarce, making them unable to see the full extent of inequality in their society; see Mijs, 2021 for a recent example of this argument), recent research suggests that rather than the rich and the poor being ‘pulled apart’, rising inequality can shape the types of interactions between more and less advantaged groups in contexts of highly asymmetric market relations (Inglis, 2019). As mentioned at the beginning of this article, while citizens can react to economic power being increasingly translated into political power through social and political mobilization, individuals can also normalize vertical relations based on market power as they become more exposed to the consequences of rising inequality. As Inglis (2019) shows, based on a ten years ethnography of private golf clubs in India, in contexts where the worse-off are exposed to conditions of deep economic insecurity, obeying powerful groups can often represent a means for which to survive.

Secondly, these findings contribute to an ongoing discussion on the asymmetry in the consequences of inequality for social cohesion. While a well-known argument in the sociological literature maintains that inequality is ‘bad for everyone’ (given that it creates social dysfunctions that affect both more and less advantaged individuals alike; see Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009, 2018), a growing scholarship is showing how higher levels of inequality can generate significantly more detrimental implications for the worse-off. The results presented here suggest that, at times of greater inequality, when more disadvantaged groups tend to have the worse-end of the majority of interactions they are exposed to, this can make them cling to authority to deal with their powerless and economically insecure position in society.

Lastly, the mechanisms behind these results shed light on the discussion about the consequences of rising inequality for liberal societies more broadly. These results are linked to the longstanding discussion of whether democracy is possible without having a basic floor of shared economic prosperity, and what are the consequences for democratic regimes when this condition is not met. If we believe democracy requires a majority of the population endorsing

democratic values (and not only a minority or a ruling elite), rising inequality can pose a threat to democratic stability. In contexts where deference to authority depends of the highly unequal distribution of resources, growing inequality can be a source of support for illiberal leaders and parties around the world, as recent research is already acknowledging (e.g., Sprong *et al.*, 2019; Panzano, 2023; Lee, 2024).

This study is not extent of weaknesses, and at least three caveats must be considered. Firstly, despite treating the IVS as repeated cross-sections of surveys allows to exploit variation across countries and over time using nationally representative samples, the selection of countries included in this study is non-random (it has been constrained by data availability and the possibility of including repeated observations over time). Hence, rather than generalizable to a broader set of countries or to a specific world region, this makes the substantive findings conditional on the observed units (Schmidt-Catran, Fairbrother and Andreß, 2019). Future studies could examine, depending on the availability of items to measure individuals' orientations toward authority, the effect of changes in hierarchical social relations in a specific set of countries or within single countries. Secondly, the available data presented in this study does not allow to rule out whether people from different socioeconomic backgrounds have a different notion of obedience (i.e., understood as obedience *from* the poor, or *for* the rich). Future studies could identify more fine-grained survey items that allow to test this nuance, exploring the effect of social stratification on obedience to different types of authorities and powerful groups in society. Thirdly, the effects presented are modest in size. This is to be expected, however, as changes in inequality are slow-moving—with effects that often span across generations—and the outcome variable provides a deep and private measure of people's notion of authority. Future studies could assess the effect of specific periods of increase or decrease in economic inequality, depending on the availability of survey items over a sufficient time window. Building upon the existing knowledge on the social sources of authoritarianism

can be key to explain the secular trend in democratic backsliding and the growing support for illiberal parties and leaders across the Western world.

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Appendix: The socio-economic foundations of authoritarianism: economic inequality as a source of deference for authority (1989-2022)

APPENDIX A: Sample and descriptive statistics

Table A1. Countries and waves (sample A: countries observed at least thrice)

	IVS waves						
	1989-1993	1994-1998	1999-2004	2005-2009	2010-2015	2016-2022	Total
Argentina		874	1280			831	2985
Armenia		1680		1269	1082	1402	5433
Australia		1725		1257	1019	1630	5631
Austria			1209	1200		1382	3791
Belarus		1903	978	1342	1503	1335	7061
Belgium			1442	1354			2796
Brazil	1657	1091		1449	1442	1555	7194
Bulgaria		873	931	2120		1333	5257
Canada			1703	1777		3997	7477
Chile		928	1130	910	890	960	4818
China			119	407	1996	2777	5299
Colombia		2986			1471	1498	5955
Croatia				1154		1280	2434
Cyprus				1828	984	518	3330
Czech Republic		911	1673	1304		1114	5002
Denmark			842	1088		3063	4993
Egypt			2602	3044	1523	1108	8277
Estonia		985	867	1318	1505	1163	5838
Finland		901	816	1904		1058	4679
France			1284	2232		1707	5223
Georgia				2768	1184	1960	5912
Germany		1631	1513	2866	1929	3343	11282
Greece			920	1272		1123	3315
Hungary			924	2220		1151	4295
Iceland			876	681		1465	3022
India	1782	1433	1941	1590	3576		10322
Indonesia			852	1717		3165	5734
Ireland			816	328			1144
Italy			1405	1571		1597	4573
Japan			1110	934	1821		3865
Jordan			1129		1193		2322
Latvia		1123	909	1250			3282
Lithuania		892	822	1202		1180	4096
Malaysia				1057	1298	1313	3668
Mexico		1201	1197	1408	1920	1614	7340
Moldova		946	922	2249			4117
Morocco			794	991			1785
Netherlands			928	1976	1589	1978	6471
New Zealand		1017	773		716	871	3377
Nigeria	867	1637	1930		1759	1204	7397
Norway		1039		1932		1059	4030
Pakistan			1869		1195	1854	4918
Peru		970	1493	1367	1144	1381	6355
Philippines			1191		1198	1199	3588
Poland			1057	1933	910	1061	4961
Portugal				785			785
Romania		1209	989	2474	1444	2212	8328
Russia		1913	2321	2752	2270	3183	12439
Serbia				2357		2037	4394
Singapore			1239		1921	1923	5083
Slovakia		895	1228	1071		951	4145
Slovenia			637	1683	994	925	4239
South Africa		2309	2399	2678	3144		10530
South Korea		1171	1196	1198	1157	1245	5967
Spain		863	1645	2006	1042	876	6432
Sweden		933	967	1929	1133	1116	6078
Switzerland	985	918		2042		2747	6692
Taiwan		712		1222	1159	1221	4314
Thailand				1458	1099	1266	3823
Turkey	917	1245	3964	2031	1548	1963	11668
Ukraine		2204	1087	2233	1500	2514	9538
United Kingdom			615	1819		1532	3966
United States		1323	1123		2139	2486	7071
Uruguay		925		969	903		2797
Total	6208	43366	61657	88976	56300	86426	342933

Table A2. Countries and waves (sample B: countries observed at least four times)


	1989-1993	1994-1998	IVS waves			2010-2015	2016-2022	Total
			1999-2004	2005-2009				
Argentina		874	1280				831	2985
Armenia		1680		1269	1082		1402	5433
Australia		1725		1257	1019		1630	5631
Austria			1209	1200			1382	3791
Belarus		1903	978	1342	1503		1335	7061
Brazil	1657	1091		1449	1442		1555	7194
Bulgaria		873	931	2120			1333	5257
Canada			1703	1777			3997	7477
Chile		928	1130	910	890		960	4818
China			119	407	1996		2777	5299
Colombia		2986			1471		1498	5955
Cyprus				1828	984		518	3330
Czech Republic		911	1673	1304			1114	5002
Denmark			842	1088			3063	4993
Egypt			2602	3044	1523		1108	8277
Estonia		985	867	1318	1505		1163	5838
Finland		901	816	1904			1058	4679
France			1284	2232			1707	5223
Georgia				2768	1184		1960	5912
Germany		1631	1513	2866	1929		3343	11282
Hungary			924	2220			1151	4295
India	1782	1433	1941	1590	3576			10322
Italy			1405	1571			1597	4573
Japan			1110	934	1821			3865
Latvia		1123	909	1250				3282
Lithuania			822	1202			1180	4096
Mexico		1201	1197	1408	1920		1614	7340
Moldova		946	922	2249				4117
Netherlands			928	1976	1589		1978	6471
New Zealand		1017	773		716		871	3377
Nigeria	867	1637	1930		1759		1204	7397
Norway		1039		1932			1059	4030
Pakistan			1869		1195		1854	4918
Peru		970	1493	1367	1144		1381	6355
Philippines			1191		1198		1199	3588
Poland			1057	1933	910		1061	4961
Romania		1209	989	2474	1444		2212	8328
Russia		1913	2321	2752	2270		3183	12439
Serbia				2357			2037	4394
Slovakia		895	1228	1071			951	4145
Slovenia			637	1683	994		925	4239
South Africa		2309	2399	2678	3144			10530
South Korea		1171	1196	1198	1157		1245	5967
Spain		863	1645	2006	1042		876	6432
Sweden		933	967	1929	1133		1116	6078
Switzerland	985	918		2042			2747	6692
Taiwan		712		1222	1159		1221	4314
Turkey	917	1245	3964	2031	1548		1963	11668
Ukraine		2204	1087	2233	1500		2514	9538
United Kingdom			615	1819			1532	3966
United States		1323	1123		2139		2486	7071
Total	6208	42441	53589	77210	49886	74891		304225

Table A3. Countries and waves (sample C: countries observed at five times)

	1989-1993	1994-1998	1999-2004	IVS waves			2010-2015	2016-2022	Total
				2005-2009					
Argentina		874	1280					831	2985
Belarus		1903	978	1342	1503			1335	7061
Brazil	1657	1091		1449	1442			1555	7194
Bulgaria		873	931	2120				1333	5257
Chile		928	1130	910	890			960	4818
China			119	407	1996			2777	5299
Colombia		2986			1471			1498	5955
Czech Republic		911	1673	1304				1114	5002
Estonia		985	867	1318	1505			1163	5838
Finland		901	816	1904				1058	4679
France			1284	2232				1707	5223
Georgia				2768	1184			1960	5912
Germany		1631	1513	2866	1929			3343	11282
Hungary			924	2220				1151	4295
India	1782	1433	1941	1590	3576				10322

Italy		1405	1571		1597	4573
Japan		1110	934	1821		3865
Lithuania	892	822	1202		1180	4096
Mexico	1201	1197	1408	1920	1614	7340
Netherlands		928	1976	1589	1978	6471
Nigeria	867	1637	1930	1759	1204	7397
Norway		1039	1932		1059	4030
Peru		970	1493	1144	1381	6355
Poland		1057	1933	910	1061	4961
Romania		1209	989	2474	1444	8328
Russia		1913	2321	2752	2270	3183
Serbia			2357		2037	4394
Slovakia	895	1228	1071		951	4145
Slovenia		637	1683	994	925	4239
South Africa		2309	2399	2678	3144	10530
South Korea		1171	1196	1198	1157	1245
Spain		863	1645	2006	1042	876
Sweden		933	967	1929	1133	1116
Switzerland	985	918		2042		2747
Turkey	917	1245	3964	2031	1548	1963
Ukraine		2204	1087	2233	1500	2514
United Kingdom			615	1819		1532
United States		1323	1123		2139	2486
Total	6208	35238	41569	61026	41010	56646
						241697

Figure A1. Levels of authoritarianism across countries (1981-2022)



Source: Author's own elaboration based on IVS data (sample A).

Figure A2. Changes in authoritarianism over time (1981-2022)



Source: Author's own elaboration based on IVS data (sample A).

Table A4. Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables

Country	Authoritarianism	Gini index	Income
Argentina	0.32	42.12	2.72
Armenia	0.20	37.26	2.33
Australia	0.30	31.12	2.83
Austria	0.18	29.04	2.80
Belarus	0.34	24.57	2.53
Belgium	0.37	25.08	2.86
Brazil	0.49	50.47	2.09
Bulgaria	0.20	33.10	2.52
Canada	0.23	30.27	3.07
Chile	0.48	48.80	2.56
China	0.12	39.87	2.45
Colombia	0.51	50.47	2.27
Croatia	0.28	28.21	2.85
Cyprus	0.42	29.65	2.89
Czech Republic	0.22	23.34	2.63
Denmark	0.13	24.61	3.01
Egypt	0.57	39.86	2.58
Estonia	0.32	32.14	2.36
Finland	0.26	24.56	2.93
France	0.32	29.69	2.68
Georgia	0.19	39.71	1.96
Germany	0.15	27.46	2.69

Greece	0.21	32.64	2.78
Hong Kong	0.09	39.98	2.62
Hungary	0.32	25.76	2.51
Iceland	0.13	26.71	3.09
India	0.69	44.16	2.30
Indonesia	0.42	45.37	2.69
Ireland	0.42	31.71	3.24
Italy	0.27	32.69	2.68
Japan	0.06	29.19	2.63
Jordan	0.56	37.31	2.47
Latvia	0.22	31.50	2.39
Lithuania	0.19	32.36	3.10
Malaysia	0.21	40.24	2.99
Mexico	0.52	46.93	2.41
Moldova	0.30	37.15	2.57
Morocco	0.45	40.63	2.41
Netherlands	0.27	26.09	2.95
New Zealand	0.22	32.36	3.21
Nigeria	0.68	41.64	2.82
Norway	0.24	24.37	2.89
Pakistan	0.46	34.62	2.57
Peru	0.52	49.24	2.16
Philippines	0.40	41.40	2.52
Poland	0.36	29.12	2.43
Portugal	0.38	33.76	2.30
Romania	0.19	31.00	2.46
Russia	0.30	34.25	2.81
Serbia	0.38	33.37	2.68
Singapore	0.33	39.00	2.73
Slovakia	0.27	22.97	2.48
Slovenia	0.29	23.80	2.68
South Africa	0.44	61.38	2.62
South Korea	0.12	32.42	2.57
Spain	0.39	32.05	2.57
Sweden	0.14	25.38	3.09
Switzerland	0.17	30.38	3.00
Taiwan	0.16	29.70	2.66
Thailand	0.38	40.04	2.80
Turkey	0.41	41.33	2.29
Ukraine	0.38	28.73	2.36
United Kingdom	0.33	32.07	3.18
United States	0.29	36.45	2.98
Uruguay	0.39	40.00	2.61
Total	0.32	34.97	2.64

Source: Author's own calculations based on IVS data (sample A).

Table A5. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Coding	Response, percentage and average
<i>Individual-level variables</i>		
Authoritarianism	0 Not mentioned; 1 Important	67.32; 32.68
Gender	0 Man; 1 Woman	46.86; 53.14
Age (years)	18 – 108	Avg. = 44.62
Education	1 Lower; 2 Middle; 3 Upper	26.17; 44.94; 28.89
Income	1 Low – 5 Top	Avg. = 2.63
Employment	0 Others; 1 Employed	44.78; 55.22
Children	0 None – 4+	Avg. = 1.63
Religiosity	1 Never/practically never - More than once a week 7	Avg. = 4.34
<i>Contextual variables</i>		
Gini index (cross-sectional)	22.97 – 61.59	Avg. = 35.41
Gini index (longitudinal)	-4.83 – 5.19	Avg. = 0.25
Log GDP/capita	-0.84 – 4.48	Avg. = 2.89
Democracy duration	1 – 219	Avg. = 48.34
Postsocialist	0 No; 1 Yes	83.37; 16.63
Confucian heritage	0 No; 1 Yes	94.33; 5.67
Catholic heritage	0 No; 1 Yes	71.03; 28.97


Source: Author's own elaboration. Sources: IVS, SWIID, Penn World Table, and Boix, Miller and Rosato (2022)

Table A6. Bivariate correlations of all variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
(1) Authoritarianism	1.000																			
(2) Gender	-0.005	1.000																		
(3) Age	-0.024	0.016	1.000																	
(4) Education	-0.141	-0.040	-0.202	1.000																
(5) Income	-0.099	-0.056	-0.119	0.316	1.000															
(6) Employment	-0.068	-0.194	-0.254	0.199	0.234	1.000														
(7) Children	0.071	0.063	0.440	-0.231	-0.072	-0.079	1.000													
(8) Religiosity	-0.139	-0.059	-0.018	0.071	0.056	0.063	-0.141	1.000												
(9) Gini index	0.175	-0.022	-0.172	-0.076	-0.097	-0.035	0.068	-0.282	1.000											
(10) Gini index (BE)	0.178	-0.024	-0.181	-0.078	-0.095	-0.028	0.071	-0.287	0.979	1.000										
(11) Gini index (WE)	0.006	0.005	0.022	0.013	-0.018	-0.039	-0.008	-0.010	0.206	0.000	1.000									
(12) Log GDP/C	-0.197	0.019	0.198	0.085	0.128	0.035	-0.089	0.291	-0.473	-0.487	0.019	1.000								
(13) Log GDP/C (BE)	-0.198	0.015	0.179	0.092	0.122	0.042	-0.085	0.296	-0.513	-0.525	0.000	0.924	1.000							
(14) Log GDP/C (WE)	-0.046	0.015	0.093	0.008	0.044	-0.010	-0.029	0.056	-0.018	-0.029	0.050	0.422	0.044	1.000						
(15) Democracy (V-dem)	-0.069	-0.002	0.133	0.055	0.061	-0.015	-0.015	0.133	-0.327	-0.337	0.018	0.530	0.550	0.082	1.000					
(16) Democracy (Boix)	-0.072	-0.010	0.068	0.055	0.103	0.059	0.005	0.151	-0.103	-0.101	-0.015	0.361	0.343	0.130	0.064	1.000				
(17) Postsocialist	-0.037	0.031	0.041	0.090	-0.042	-0.022	-0.059	0.051	-0.132	-0.135	0.000	-0.208	-0.214	-0.035	-0.351	-0.288	1.000			
(18) Confucian	-0.126	-0.006	-0.001	0.036	-0.004	0.058	-0.017	0.099	-0.006	-0.006	0.000	0.085	0.073	0.050	-0.176	0.197	-0.115	1.000		
(19) Catholic	0.057	0.006	0.003	-0.091	-0.066	-0.020	-0.014	-0.008	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.058	0.066	-0.003	0.344	-0.233	-0.294	-0.189	1.000	
(20) Time	-0.067	0.013	0.110	0.054	0.053	-0.008	-0.034	0.046	0.021	-0.009	0.142	0.322	0.034	0.763	-0.066	0.114	0.038	0.059	-0.144	1.000


Source: Author's own elaboration based on IVS data (sample A)

Figure A3. Authoritarianism across waves (1981-2022)




Source: Author's own calculations based on IVS data (sample A).

Figure A4. Inequality and authoritarianism (BE)




Source: Author's own calculations based on IVS data (sample A).

Figure A5. Inequality and authoritarianism (country-year average)



Source: Author's own calculations based on IVS data (sample A).

Figure A6. Inequality and authoritarianism (WE)



Source: Author's own calculations based on IVS data (sample A).

APPENDIX B: Multivariate Analyses and Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Predictors</i>				
Income quintile (<i>ref. bottom</i>)				
Lower-middle (2)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.027* (0.011)
Middle income (3)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.068*** (0.014)	-0.071*** (0.013)
Upper-middle (4)	-0.045*** (0.003)	-0.045*** (0.003)	-0.070*** (0.019)	-0.075*** (0.017)
Top (5)	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.099*** (0.025)	-0.108*** (0.023)
<i>Country-year-level variables</i>				
Gini index	0.005** (0.002)			
Gini index (BE)		0.006*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Gini index (WE)		-0.000 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>				
Gini (BE)*Lower-middle (2)			0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Gini (BE)*Middle (3)			0.001** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Gini (BE)*Upper-middle (4)			0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)
Gini (BE)*Top (5)			0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)			-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)			-0.004* (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)			-0.007** (0.002)	-0.008* (0.003)
<i>Contextual controls</i>				
Gdp/capita (logged)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.047** (0.016)	-0.041* (0.017)	-0.042* (0.017)
Years of democracy	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Postsocialist	-0.071 (0.038)	-0.061 (0.038)	-0.051 (0.042)	-0.051 (0.041)
Confucian heritage	-0.202*** (0.048)	-0.199*** (0.047)	-0.223*** (0.052)	-0.220*** (0.051)
Catholic heritage	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.000 (0.027)	0.013 (0.029)	0.014 (0.029)
<i>Individual-level controls</i>				
Female	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)
Age	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Education (<i>ref. Lower</i>)				
Middle	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)
Upper	-0.117*** (0.002)	-0.117*** (0.002)	-0.117*** (0.002)	-0.116*** (0.002)
Employed	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)
Number of children	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Religiosity	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)
<i>Waves (ref. 1989-1993)</i>				
1994-1998	0.053 (0.042)	0.046 (0.042)	0.047 (0.042)	0.040 (0.045)
1999-2004	0.082 (0.042)	0.075 (0.042)	0.076 (0.042)	0.071 (0.045)
2005-2009	0.110** (0.042)	0.103* (0.042)	0.102* (0.042)	0.091* (0.045)
2010-2015	0.116** (0.044)	0.104* (0.044)	0.103* (0.044)	0.082 (0.047)

2016-2022	0.042 (0.044)	0.029 (0.044)	0.027 (0.044)	-0.004 (0.047)
Constant	0.398*** (0.092)	0.353*** (0.095)	0.337*** (0.101)	0.359*** (0.101)
<i>N</i> countries	64	64	64	64
<i>N</i> country-years	259	259	259	259
<i>N</i> respondents	342,933	342,933	342,933	342,933

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A8. The Effect of Income Inequality on Authoritarianism (cFES, sample A)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Predictors</i>				
Income quintile (<i>ref. bottom</i>)				
Lower-middle (2)	-0.084*** (0.012)	-0.112 (0.121)	-0.071*** (0.012)	-0.118 (0.123)
Middle (3)	-0.127*** (0.012)	0.022 (0.114)	-0.128*** (0.012)	0.019 (0.119)
Upper-middle (4)	-0.226*** (0.014)	-0.063 (0.133)	-0.235*** (0.014)	-0.063 (0.133)
Top (5)	-0.341*** (0.019)	-0.340* (0.156)	-0.356*** (0.019)	-0.349* (0.157)
Gini	0.009 (0.005)	0.012* (0.006)	0.021 (0.013)	0.024 (0.014)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>				
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle	-0.020** (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.024** (0.008)
Gini (WE)*Middle	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.024** (0.008)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.009)
Gini (WE)*Top	-0.033** (0.012)	-0.035* (0.014)	-0.039** (0.012)	-0.033* (0.014)
<i>Controls</i>				
Gdp/capita (logged)	-0.018 (0.022)	-0.023 (0.023)	0.262*** (0.043)	0.237*** (0.044)
Years of democracy	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)
Female	-0.075*** (0.008)	-0.076*** (0.008)	-0.075*** (0.008)	-0.075*** (0.008)
Age	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Education (<i>ref. Lower</i>)				
Middle	-0.215*** (0.011)	-0.214*** (0.011)	-0.228*** (0.011)	-0.227*** (0.011)
Upper	-0.588*** (0.012)	-0.590*** (0.012)	-0.606*** (0.013)	-0.607*** (0.013)
Employed	-0.137*** (0.009)	-0.125*** (0.009)	-0.130*** (0.009)	-0.120*** (0.009)
Number of children	0.029*** (0.003)	0.030*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.004)
Religiosity	-0.048*** (0.002)	-0.048*** (0.002)	-0.047*** (0.002)	-0.046*** (0.002)
<i>Waves (ref. 1989-1993)</i>				
1994-1998	0.288*** (0.033)	0.289*** (0.033)	0.194*** (0.039)	0.182*** (0.040)
1999-2004	0.413*** (0.033)	0.427*** (0.033)	0.283*** (0.040)	0.277*** (0.041)
2005-2009	0.507*** (0.035)	0.518*** (0.036)	0.259*** (0.046)	0.255*** (0.046)
2010-2015	0.486*** (0.038)	0.499*** (0.038)	0.265*** (0.051)	0.268*** (0.052)
2016-2022	0.025 (0.039)	0.052 (0.040)	-0.160** (0.054)	-0.148** (0.055)
Constant	-0.178* (0.076)	-0.254* (0.111)	-0.836*** (0.125)	-0.839*** (0.151)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies*Income		Yes		
Country dummies*Gini			Yes	
Country dummies*Income*Gini				Yes
<i>N</i> respondents	342,933	342,933	342,933	342,933
R ²	0.109	0.111	0.114	0.116

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A9. The Effect of Income Inequality on Authoritarianism (jackknife estimates)

	(Argentina)	(Armenia)	(Australia)	(Austria)	(Belarus)	(Belgium)	(Brazil)	(Bulgaria)	(Canada)	(Chile)
Gini (BE)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Gini (WE)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>										
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)	-0.005** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.005** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)
Constant	0.330** (0.102)	0.378*** (0.100)	0.339*** (0.101)	0.339*** (0.101)	0.329** (0.101)	0.332*** (0.101)	0.363*** (0.104)	0.339*** (0.101)	0.338*** (0.102)	0.347*** (0.104)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N respondents	339,948	337,500	337,302	339,142	335,872	340,137	335,739	337,676	335,456	338,115
N countries	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63

continuation of Table A9

	(China)	(Colombia)	(Croatia)	(Cyprus)	(Czech R.)	(Denmark)	(Egypt)	(Estonia)	(Finland)	(France)
Gini (BE)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
Gini (WE)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>										
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)
Constant	0.341*** (0.100)	0.340*** (0.103)	0.332** (0.102)	0.327** (0.100)	0.342*** (0.102)	0.352*** (0.101)	0.328** (0.101)	0.334*** (0.101)	0.333** (0.103)	0.339*** (0.101)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N respondents	337,634	336,978	340,499	339,603	337,931	337,940	334,656	337,095	338,254	337,710
N countries	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63

continuation of Table A9

	(Georgia)	(Germany)	(Greece)	(Hong Kong)	(Hungary)	(Iceland)	(India)	(Indonesia)	(Ireland)	(Italy)
Gini (BE)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
Gini (WE)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.001)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)
Constant	0.326*** (0.099)	0.350*** (0.101)	0.335*** (0.101)	0.338*** (0.101)	0.340*** (0.102)	0.346*** (0.101)	0.340** (0.104)	0.324** (0.102)	0.347*** (0.099)	0.336*** (0.102)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N respondents	337,021	331,651	339,618	342,933	338,638	339,911	332,611	337,199	341,789	338,360
N countries	63	63	63	64	63	63	63	63	63	63

continuation of Table A9

	(Japan)	(Jordan)	(Latvia)	(Lithuania)	(Malaysia)	(Mexico)	(Moldova)	(Morocco)	(Netherlands)	(New Zealand)
Gini (BE)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
Gini (WE)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)

<i>Cross-level interactions</i>										
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.005**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.003*	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.343***	0.330**	0.356***	0.353***	0.332***	0.354***	0.349***	0.338***	0.332**	0.339***
	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N respondents	339,068	340,611	339,651	338,837	339,265	335,593	338,816	341,148	336,462	339,556
N countries	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63

continuation of Table A9

	(Nigeria)	(Norway)	(Pakistan)	(Peru)	(Philippines)	(Poland)	(Portugal)	(Romania)	(Russia)	(Serbia)
Gini (BE)	0.006***	0.006**	0.006**	0.005**	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**	0.005**	0.006**	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini (WE)	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>										
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)	-0.003*	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.003	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.006*	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.008***	-0.005*	-0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.243*	0.335***	0.319**	0.347***	0.346***	0.334**	0.337***	0.359***	0.351***	0.341***
	(0.110)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.100)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N respondents	335,536	338,903	338,015	336,578	339,345	337,972	342,148	334,605	330,494	338,539
N countries	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63

continuation of Table A9

	(Singapore)	(Slovakia)	(Slovenia)	(South Africa)	(South Korea)	(Spain)	(Sweden)	(Switzerland)	(Taiwan)	(Thailand)
Gini (BE)	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**	0.007**	0.006**	0.006**	0.005**	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini (WE)	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>										
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)	-0.004**	-0.003*	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.008***	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.341***	0.343***	0.326**	0.302**	0.342***	0.341***	0.347***	0.322**	0.344***	0.341***
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.101)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N respondents	337,850	338,788	338,694	332,403	336,966	336,501	336,855	336,241	338,619	339,110
N countries	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63

continuation of Table A9

	(Turkey)	(Ukraine)	(United Kingdom)	(United States)	(Uruguay)
Gini (BE)	0.006**	0.006**	0.005**	0.006**	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini (WE)	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>					
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)	-0.004**	-0.003	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)

Gini (WE)*Middle (3)	-0.003*	-0.003	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)	-0.006**	-0.005*	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.350***	0.326**	0.350***	0.341***	0.335***
	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.102)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N respondents	331,265	333,395	338,967	335,862	340,136
N countries	63	63	63	63	63

Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022. *Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses. All models include gender, age, education, income, labour market status, number of children, religiosity, economic performance, years of democracy, postsocialist, Confucian and Catholic heritage controls.

Table A10. The Effect of Income Inequality on Authoritarianism (linear time trend)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Predictors</i>				
Lower-middle (2)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.026* (0.011)
Middle (3)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.068*** (0.014)	-0.071*** (0.013)
Upper-middle (4)	-0.045*** (0.003)	-0.045*** (0.003)	-0.070*** (0.019)	-0.074*** (0.017)
Top (5)	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.100*** (0.025)	-0.106*** (0.023)
Gini (BE)		0.006*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Gini (WE)		0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Gini (WE)* Lower-middle (2)			-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)
Gini (WE)* Middle (3)			-0.004* (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)
Gini (WE)* Upper-middle (4)			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Gini (WE)* Top (5)			-0.007** (0.002)	-0.008* (0.003)
Gdp/capita (logged)	-0.047*** (0.013)	-0.045*** (0.013)	-0.041** (0.014)	-0.054*** (0.014)
Years of democracy	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Postsocialist	-0.064 (0.037)	-0.060 (0.037)	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.040)
Confucian	-0.199*** (0.047)	-0.197*** (0.047)	-0.221*** (0.051)	-0.217*** (0.050)
Catholic heritage	0.001 (0.027)	0.003 (0.027)	0.018 (0.030)	0.019 (0.029)
Female	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)
Age	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Education (<i>ref. Lower</i>)				
Middle	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)
Upper	-0.118*** (0.002)	-0.118*** (0.002)	-0.117*** (0.002)	-0.117*** (0.002)
Employed	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)
Number of children	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Religiosity	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)
Time	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.424*** (0.081)	0.400*** (0.084)	0.386*** (0.089)	0.451*** (0.089)
N countries	64	64	64	64
N country-years	259	259	259	259
N respondents	342,933	342,933	342,933	342,933

Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022. *Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A11. The Effect of Income Inequality on Authoritarianism (Vdem's democracy measure)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Predictors</i>				
Lower-middle (2)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.023* (0.011)	-0.027** (0.010)
Middle (3)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.069*** (0.014)	-0.072*** (0.013)
Upper-middle (4)	-0.045*** (0.003)	-0.045*** (0.003)	-0.072*** (0.019)	-0.076*** (0.017)
Top (5)	-0.064*** (0.003)	-0.064*** (0.003)	-0.102*** (0.025)	-0.110*** (0.023)
Gini	0.005** (0.002)			
Gini (BE)		0.006*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Gini (WE)		-0.000 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Gini (WE)* Lower-middle			-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Middle			-0.004* (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Gini (WE)*Top			-0.007** (0.002)	-0.008* (0.003)
Gdp/capita (logged)	-0.050** (0.016)	-0.045** (0.017)	-0.038* (0.017)	-0.041* (0.018)
Level of democracy (V-Dem)	-0.030 (0.053)	-0.031 (0.053)	-0.027 (0.056)	-0.016 (0.057)
Postsocialist	-0.074* (0.037)	-0.067 (0.037)	-0.056 (0.041)	-0.058 (0.040)
Confucian heritage	-0.212*** (0.044)	-0.211*** (0.044)	-0.237*** (0.048)	-0.232*** (0.047)
Catholic heritage	0.004 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)	0.017 (0.028)	0.014 (0.028)
Female	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)
Age	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
<i>Education (ref. Lower)</i>				
Middle	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)
Upper	-0.117*** (0.002)	-0.117*** (0.002)	-0.117*** (0.002)	-0.116*** (0.002)
Employed	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)
Number of children	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Religiosity	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)
<i>Waves (ref. 1989-1993)</i>				
1994-1998	0.052 (0.042)	0.045 (0.042)	0.047 (0.042)	0.041 (0.045)
1999-2004	0.081 (0.042)	0.074 (0.042)	0.075 (0.042)	0.071 (0.045)
2005-2009	0.108* (0.043)	0.101* (0.043)	0.101* (0.043)	0.090* (0.046)
2010-2015	0.114** (0.044)	0.103* (0.044)	0.103* (0.044)	0.082 (0.047)
2016-2022	0.041 (0.044)	0.028 (0.045)	0.027 (0.045)	-0.002 (0.048)
Constant	0.413*** (0.093)	0.374*** (0.096)	0.356*** (0.102)	0.376*** (0.103)
N countries	65	65	65	65
N country-years	262	262	262	262
N respondents	346,977	346,977	346,977	346,977

Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A12. The Effect of Income Inequality on Authoritarianism (sample B)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Predictors</i>				
Income quintile (ref. bottom)				
Lower-middle (2)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.021 (0.011)	-0.027* (0.011)

Middle income (3)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.065*** (0.014)	-0.071*** (0.013)
Upper-middle (4)	-0.047*** (0.003)	-0.047*** (0.003)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.069*** (0.017)
Top (5)	-0.065*** (0.004)	-0.065*** (0.004)	-0.090*** (0.025)	-0.105*** (0.023)
Gini index	0.006*** (0.002)			
Gini index (BE)		0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
Gini index (WE)		0.001 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Gini (BE)*Lower-middle (2)			0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Gini (BE)*Middle (3)			0.001** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Gini (BE)*Upper-middle (4)			0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)
Gini (BE)*Top (5)			0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)			-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005** (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)			-0.005** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)			-0.004* (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)			-0.007** (0.002)	-0.008* (0.004)
Gdp/capita (logged)	-0.044* (0.017)	-0.040* (0.017)	-0.031 (0.018)	-0.032 (0.018)
Years of democracy	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Postsocialist	-0.080* (0.040)	-0.073 (0.041)	-0.068 (0.043)	-0.066 (0.043)
Confucian heritage	-0.206*** (0.049)	-0.204*** (0.048)	-0.232*** (0.052)	-0.228*** (0.051)
Catholic heritage	-0.020 (0.031)	-0.019 (0.031)	-0.015 (0.033)	-0.014 (0.033)
Female	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Age	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Education (<i>ref. Lower</i>)				
Middle	-0.052*** (0.002)	-0.052*** (0.002)	-0.052*** (0.002)	-0.051*** (0.002)
Upper	-0.120*** (0.003)	-0.120*** (0.003)	-0.119*** (0.003)	-0.119*** (0.003)
Employed	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)
Number of children	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Religiosity	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)
Waves (<i>ref. 1989-1993</i>)				
1994-1998	0.057 (0.042)	0.052 (0.042)	0.053 (0.042)	0.049 (0.045)
1999-2004	0.079 (0.042)	0.073 (0.042)	0.074 (0.042)	0.068 (0.045)
2005-2009	0.109* (0.043)	0.103* (0.043)	0.101* (0.043)	0.089* (0.045)
2010-2015	0.107* (0.044)	0.098* (0.044)	0.096* (0.044)	0.075 (0.047)
2016-2022	0.050 (0.044)	0.040 (0.045)	0.037 (0.045)	0.006 (0.048)
Constant	0.362*** (0.096)	0.326** (0.099)	0.304** (0.104)	0.322** (0.105)
N countries	51	51	51	51
N country-years	227	227	227	227
N respondents	304,225	304,225	304,225	304,225

Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A13. The Effect of Income Inequality on Authoritarianism (sample C)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Predictors</i>				

Income quintile (<i>ref. bottom</i>)				
Lower-middle (2)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.022 (0.011)	-0.029* (0.011)
Middle income (3)	-0.029*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.003)	-0.067*** (0.015)	-0.074*** (0.014)
Upper-middle (4)	-0.051*** (0.003)	-0.051*** (0.003)	-0.063** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.018)
Top (5)	-0.067*** (0.004)	-0.067*** (0.004)	-0.094*** (0.027)	-0.108*** (0.024)
Gini index	0.005** (0.002)			
Gini index (BE)		0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Gini index (WE)		0.000 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Gini (BE)*Lower-middle (2)			0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Gini (BE)*Middle (3)			0.001** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Gini (BE)*Upper-middle (4)			0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)
Gini (BE)*Top (5)			0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Gini (WE)*Lower-middle (2)			-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Middle (3)			-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)
Gini (WE)*Upper-middle (4)			-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)
Gini (WE)*Top (5)			-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.010* (0.004)
Gdp/capita (logged)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.068*** (0.019)	-0.056** (0.020)	-0.058** (0.020)
Years of democracy	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Postsocialist	-0.094* (0.043)	-0.087* (0.043)	-0.075 (0.047)	-0.072 (0.046)
Confucian heritage	-0.255*** (0.052)	-0.252*** (0.052)	-0.279*** (0.056)	-0.273*** (0.055)
Catholic heritage	-0.016 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.036)
Female	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Age	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Education (<i>ref. Lower</i>)				
Middle	-0.051*** (0.002)	-0.051*** (0.002)	-0.051*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)
Upper	-0.120*** (0.003)	-0.120*** (0.003)	-0.120*** (0.003)	-0.119*** (0.003)
Employed	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)
Number of children	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Religiosity	-0.010*** (0.000)	-0.010*** (0.000)	-0.010*** (0.000)	-0.010*** (0.000)
Waves (<i>ref. 1989-1993</i>)				
1994-1998	0.056 (0.044)	0.050 (0.044)	0.050 (0.044)	0.050 (0.045)
1999-2004	0.087* (0.044)	0.081 (0.044)	0.081 (0.044)	0.074 (0.046)
2005-2009	0.129** (0.045)	0.122** (0.045)	0.119** (0.045)	0.109* (0.046)
2010-2015	0.141** (0.047)	0.132** (0.048)	0.125** (0.048)	0.111* (0.049)
2016-2022	0.072 (0.047)	0.061 (0.048)	0.055 (0.048)	0.024 (0.049)
Constant	0.476*** (0.101)	0.450*** (0.103)	0.412*** (0.109)	0.435*** (0.108)
<i>N</i> countries	38	38	38	38
<i>N</i> country-years	181	181	181	181
<i>N</i> respondents	241,697	241,697	241,697	241,697

Source: Author's calculations, IVS 1989-2022. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

